





Abstract: We propose an extension to Mahr & Csibra’s (M&C’s) theory.
For successful episodic memory formation, potentially relevant aspects
of a situation need to be identified and encoded online and retained for
prospective interactions. To be maximally convincing, the communicator
not only has to encode not just any contextual detail, but also has to
track information in relation to social partners.
Mahr & Csibra (M&C) propose that the main function of episodic
memory is to create reliable information packages through episodic
reconstruction in order to convince others about the authenticity of
a certain statement. Although the account offered does not make
any predictions about the mechanisms involved, M&C argue that
“the main achievements in episodic memory development occur
as a consequence of the development of retrieval mechanisms”
(sect. 4, para. 5). Consequently, they leave open the relationship
between the characteristics of encoding and retrieval processes.
We propose that an extension of the present theory may be
fruitful with regard to the encoding of memory traces that later
may become constituents of episodic memories. As retrieval is a
search among memory traces, it is necessary that the selection
process of elements that are encoded is determined by the
same factors that later trigger and guide the construction of epi-
sodic memories (Tulving & Thomson 1973; Wagner et al. 1998).
If the role of episodic memories is to provide proof for reliable
information through asserting epistemic authority, and as M&C
argue, “contextual elements that … make verification possible
… allow one to be perceived as more convincing” (sect. 3.1.1,
para. 7), then parts of a situation that may make reporting it
later as authentic should be more likely encoded in the first place.
According to M&C’s proposal, episodic memory is useful for
keeping social commitments, an essential part of human social
life. Recalling an episodic memory aims to serve as justification
for the authentic nature of our belief, and it may be scrutinized
by our interlocutor. Therefore, we can apply self-directed episte-
mic vigilance beforehand to assess the likelihood that the interlocutor
would accept the content as legitimate. In their conceptualization,
following the argument of Cosmides and Tooby (2000), in human
communicative interactions it is useful to maintain the causal
history of first-person beliefs.
We suggest that in order to retain the causal history of beliefs,
encoding processes need to be sensitive to potential aspects of a
situation that can be retrieved when an episodic memory is
formed –which also enables avoiding assertions that would lead
the social partner to decline our claims of epistemic authority.
This applies to the causal history of first-person beliefs that
M&C discuss, but it is also necessary with regard to third-person
beliefs. The latter is especially important because, although it
may happen that we have no prior communicative episode with
the social partner, assertions of epistemic authority are in fact
often preceded by a history of interactions with the addressee.
This notion appears in M&C’s examples as well (e.g., sect. 3.1.1,
para. 1): John and Jenny are on a walk, and Jenny expresses her
belief that they might have left the oven on at home. John
replies, “Don’t worry, I remember that we turned it off.” In this
communicative episode, the reference to remembering makes
Jenny both (1) accept John’s belief as true and (2) change her
own belief as well. However, this assertion may not be as effective
if Jenny had also expressed that her worries emerged from
remembering that she saw the oven working right before they
left the apartment; if Jenny did not remember that John has
indeed been in the kitchen that morning; or especially if she
had reasons to think that John in fact did not go into the
kitchen. Consequently, for such arguments to be successful, it is
necessary that the communicator not only retrieve and use
information about the source of her or his first-person beliefs,
but also select information potentially relevant and adequate for
persuading the partner, which could be done only in relation to
the communicative partner’s access to the events in question.
For successful construction of episodic memories that are used
in communication, one therefore often has to encode not just any
contextual detail, but track information in relation to a specific
social partner. To later recall information that is relevant for
that social partner, one must – at the time a specific episode
takes place – select, encode, and store (and, often, index) – those
elements to a specific person. Additionally, one must take into
account any aspects of the event that may potentially contribute
to the later construction of the episodic memory related to that
communication encounter.
A further challenge is to describe what enables the identifica-
tion of relevant memory traces at reconstruction. M&C argue
that episodic memory requires not only the understanding that
seeing leads to knowing, but further that seeing validates claims
about knowledge. We propose that in order to bridge encoding
and retrieval, online theory of mind (by which we mean real-
time, continuous belief monitoring) has to support the encoding
of information potentially relevant to the basis of belief formation.
Episodic memory “hooks” onto these elements (of the causal
history of belief formation for the social partner’s belief), and if
a later cue refers to these bases of previously formed (attributed)
beliefs, this enables the collection of adequate components of
episodic memory. Importantly, this process requires the reidenti-
fication of the social partner, and the attribution of the social
knowledge base and monitoring of potential differences
between the self and the partner. Altogether, this mechanism
increases the (perceived) veridicality of episodic beliefs reported
in a communicative interaction.
The suggested interdependence between episodic memory and
theory of mind opens novel perspectives with regard to the devel-
opmental trajectory of both domains. Namely, the emergence of
episodic memory retrieval would be bootstrapped by communica-
tive situations (e.g., Southgate et al. 2010) especially when mind-
reading is involved; and relatedly, the mindreading system could
learn to update previously attributed beliefs according to relevant
new information (Király et al., in preparation) through the emer-
gence of episodic memory.
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Abstract:Mahr & Csibra (M&C) argue that event and episodic memories
share the same scenario construction process. I think this way of carving up
the distinction throws the baby out with the bathwater. If there is a
substantive difference between event and episodic memory, it is based
on a difference in the construction process and how they are organized,
respectively.
In the target article, Mahr & Csibra (M&C) challenge overly cog-
nitive accounts of episodic memory based on the mental time
travel metaphor. Instead, they offer a social-cognitive function
of episodic memory in terms of an epistemic attitude that signals
testimonial authority in human communications. I applaud the
proposed shift in focus toward the social-cognitive functions of
Commentary/Mahr & Csibra: Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory
30 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 41 (2018)
episodic memory, and I suspect thatM&C’s suggestionmay not be
the only function of episodic memory in the social domain.
M&C also propose a distinction between event and episodic
memory. As they mention, and as I have argued elsewhere
(Keven 2016b), the distinction has the potential to resolve the
long-lasting debate about whether episodic memory is a uniquely
human capacity. If the distinction is proven to be robust, we can
understand the mnemonic abilities of young children and nonhu-
man animals with event memory without ascribing to them a
capacity for full-blown episodic memory. However, it is not
clear how to distinguish event and episodic memory at this
stage. M&C suggest that event and episodic memory share the
same scenario construction process, whereas I think the type of
construction involved in episodic memory is different in kind
from that of event memory. We can distinguish at least four differ-
ent types of organization that could be utilized in memory
reconstructions:
1. Spatial organization: We perceive the world in a spatially
organized way and can recall our experiences as such.
2. Temporal organization:Experiences occur sequentially in
time, such as before or after another event. When we reconstruct
an experience from memory, the events should occur in their
proper place in the sequence.
3. Causal organization: Events can be distant in time and yet
can have causal connections with each other. I remember that
I missed my bus to Istanbul because my alarm didn’t ring.
Missing the bus and the malfunctioning alarm clock are two tem-
porally distant events that are causally connected in my memory
reconstruction.
4. Teleological organization: Temporally distant and caus-
ally disparate events can still be connected with each other
based on goals. For instance, I remember that I was going to
give a talk when I missed the bus, so I took a plane instead to
get there in time. Although giving a talk is temporally distant
and causally disparate from the malfunctioning alarm clock and
missing the bus, it is still connected to them in my memory as
my goal at the time.
In M&C’s view, both event and episodic memory involve con-
struction of a scenario that involves simulation of events that are
extended in time and space. It is not clear whether these simula-
tions involve all of these four types of organization. If they want to
maintain that young children and other nonhuman animals have
event memories, however, then there have to be some differences
in the construction of event and episodic memories. Even though
there is some evidence that nonhuman animals can be sensitive to
temporal information (e.g., Babb & Crystal 2006; Clayton &Dick-
inson 1998), it is far from clear whether this amounts to an ability
to temporally sequence events into before and after relations
(McCormack & Hoerl 2011; Roberts & Feeney 2009). Moreover,
causal understanding of our primate cousins is very limited, and
no nonhuman animals seem to understand the behavior of
others in terms of goals (Penn & Povinelli 2007; Penn et al.
2008; Povinelli 2000; Tomasello et al. 2005; Visalberghi & Toma-
sello 1998). Similarly, young children show less temporal
sequence knowledge and omit causal relations between events
in their recall of novel experiences, and their memory representa-
tions are not organized around goals to the same extent as are
older children’s and adults (e.g., Price & Goodman 1990;
Ratner et al. 1986). So, it is unlikely that event memories in
young children and nonhuman animals can involve temporal,
causal, and teleological organization.
In earlier work (Keven 2016b), I provided evidence and argued
in favor of carving up event and episodic memory in a different
way. According to the dual systems thesis that I proposed, event
memory is a snapshot-like memory system based on perceptual
processes predominantly in the form of visual images. These per-
ceptually grounded representations are highly accurate but short-
lived. Construed as such, event memories involve only spatial
organization. Any other type of organization is not necessary in
this case, as there are no series of events that are extended in
space and time.
However, construction of episodic memories requires a higher
order inferential process. Episodes generally consist of a series of
events that are extended across different times and places. When I
remember the missing-the-bus episode, I don’t remember all of
the minute details involved in the actual experience; I remember
only the causally and teleologically relevant ones in the right tem-
poral order. To connect such a series of events, the construction
process needs to sort the events into cause and effect and goal-
attempt-outcome relations, besides keeping track of each
scene’s spatial structure and the event’s temporal order. Organiz-
ing memories in this way requires making higher-order inferences
on the relations between events from memory as these relations
are not directly observable. According to the dual systems
thesis, this inferential process is closely tied to our storytelling
capacity as narrative has nearly all of the organizational compo-
nents one would expect. Reconstructing a narrative version of
the experience provides the required temporal, causal, and teleo-
logical organization. As such, episodic memories are lower in
accuracy but can span longer timescales and are more memorable.
To sum up, when we consider different types of organization
that can be utilized in memory reconstructions, construction of
event and episodic memories differ in kind. In particular, the con-
struction of episodic memories requires a higher-order inferential
process, which is unlikely to be found in event memories.
Episodic memory solves both social and
nonsocial problems, and evolved to fulfill
many different functions
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Abstract: The episodic memory system is flexible and complex, and likely
evolved in response to a wide range of survival-relevant problems in our
evolutionary past, both social and nonsocial. Episodic memory allows us
to recollect and infer details that may have seemed trivial on encoding,
but are now known to be relevant. This memory aids humans in
navigating their uncertain environment.
The target article argues that episodic memory plays an important
role in social relations. We wholeheartedly agree, having discussed
this association in past work, as have others. The unique contribu-
tion of the target article is its proposal that episodic memory
evolved to support compelling testimony in the service of social
persuasion. This strikes us as an unsuitably narrow characteriza-
tion of episodic memory. The initial premise that led to this char-
acterization, that episodic memory evolved to solve just one
problem, appears to be at fault. There is little reason to believe
that episodic memory would be tied to a single survival-relevant
problem in our evolutionary history. In contrast, it seems logical
that flexible and complex brain networks capable of solving a
diverse array of problems would be more likely to survive
natural selection compared to systems that solve only one
problem. The distributed heteromodal cortical “real estate” that
comprises brain networks, like the one that supports episodic
memory, carries a high metabolic cost (Raichle 2010). As a
result, this high cost is likely balanced by a flexible network that
can serve numerous functions, providing many benefits and not
just one.
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